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Abstract. The purpose of this note is to point out analogies between causal analysis in
statistics and the correlation-response theory in statistical physics. It is further shown that
for some systems the dynamic cavity offers a way to compute the stationary state of a non-
equilibrium process effectively, which could then be taken an alternative starting point of causal
analysis.
1. Causality in Philosophy, Physics and Statistics
Causality formalizes the universal human experience of agents (causes) taking actions leading
to results (effects) 1. In the Western Philosophical tradition Aristotle postulated four kinds of
causes namely the material, the formal, the efficient and the final, out of which Bacon retained
the material and the efficient. The material cause is in modern terms the material properties of
an object, ultimately determined by which atoms it is composed of and how these are ordered
in space, while the efficient cause is how the object is influenced by other objects. The Third
Law of Newton [20] however states that in Nature there is no separation between cause and
effect in the Aristotelian or Baconian sense; Physics fundamentally knows only interactions, and
these are always mutual, a state of affairs unchanged since that time and the replacement of the
Classical Physics by Quantum Physics. When the term causal is used to describe an interaction
in modern high-energy Physics it means only that the influence cannot propagate faster than
light so that object A at time tA only depends on what happened at object B at times tB early
enough that a signal from B can reach A at time tA, and vice versa [26].
The everyday and the philosophical notions of causality are in Physics instead intertwined
with reversibility and irreversibility; Nature’s laws are time-reversal invariant on the fundamental
1 The literature on this topic is too vast and variegated to be meaningfully referenced; two classic studies from
the perspective of belief systems in traditional societies can be found in [16] and [5].
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level, but most ordinarily encountered processes are overwhelmingly likely to only flow in one
direction [11, 7]. We say that dropping a glass vase on the floor is the cause of it breaking because
it is exceedingly unlikely that the glass pieces would jump back together and fuse into a vase.
Similarly, we say an enzyme causes a chemical reaction in one direction when the concentrations
of the reactants are such that the opposite reaction is very unlikely. Although the details of
this complex process are not fully known, we can also say that smoking causes cancer because
the DNA in living cells is mostly that of one and the same genome for each individual – an
extremely small subset of all possible DNA sequences of the same length – and cancerogenes in
tobacco smoke therefore almost always lead to mutations away from the healthy genotype and
into one out of very many deficient genotypes. In Nature cause-effect relationships are thus but
abbreviations for processes in physical systems so strongly driven out of thermal equilibrium
that they mostly only go one way.
Nevertheless, causal analysis is an important branch of statistics, describing the effects of
interventions and answering questions of the “if-so-then-what?” character [21, 22]. Interventions
are then taken to be outside Nature, typically ascribed to a human agent, and causality is thus
distinct from statistical association studies. If person X is holding a glass vase and person Y
trips him over, then person X is quite likely to fall and break the vase. However, we cannot know
this for sure without observing the event as person X might for instance be much larger and
stronger than Y . Likewise, if we can deactivate enzyme E then we can observe that a catalyzed
reaction S1 → S2 ceases, while if we can over-activate E then the catalyzed reaction goes faster.
This is the paradigm for how molecular biologists identity interactions experimentally; good
research practice and common sense hold that observing such direct responses is a more reliable
means to acquire knowledge than observing the variations of E and the speed of the reaction
S1 → S2 in natural undisturbed conditions. For example, the catalyzed reaction may be one in a
series of reactions S1 → S2 → S3 → S4 → · · · , catalyzed by enzymes E,E2, E3, . . . and the living
cell may regulate the production of all these enzymes by the availability of the first substrate
S1 [1]. In this case E,E2, E3, . . . would all vary positively with the speed of the reaction S1 → S2
and only a direct experiment can determine which of them actually does the job.
The first purpose of this paper is to show that there is a conceptual parallelism between causal
analysis in statistics and long-time response functions in physics. A main difference is that the
results of an intervention in causal analysis is (comparatively) easy to determine, while the
response function integrates dynamical information on all time scales. The second purpose is to
show how the tools of message-passing/Belief Propagation, developed to analyse complex static
interdepencies, have been generalized to describe dynamics with complex interactions, and then
known as dynamic cavity. Under suitable assumptions the dynamic cavity simplifies considerably
the determination long-time responses, which can hence be considered an alternative starting
point of a causal analysis. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in
simple terms causal analysis, following mainly [23]. In Section 3 we give a short summary of
correlation-response theory using Markov chains (synchronously updated spin systems) as our
main example, and show the parallelism between a causal analysis and correlation-response. In
Section 4 we describe dynamic cavity as a generalization of message-passing/Belief Propagation
to dynamic phenomena, and show that it can be used to turn correlation-response into an
alternative to causal analysis, for some systems. In Section 5 we sum up and discuss our results.
2. Causal analysis
Statistical physicists are nowadays conversant with graphical models to describe probability
distributions [27, 18]. To explain causal analysis we will start with two very simple Bayesian
belief networks
(a) lA← lB → lC and (b) lA→ lB → lC (1)
where by lA→ lB we mean that both the random variable B is dependent on random variable A
in the ordinary sense of probability, and also that A (somehow) causes B. The dependency is
encoded in conditional probabilities PA|B(a|b) where a and b are values of A and B. The joint
probabilities of the three variables are in the two cases
Case (a) PB(b)PA|B(a|b)PC|B(c|b) =
PA,B(a, b)PC,B(c, b)
PB(b)
Case (b) PA(a)PB|A(b|a)PC|B(c|b) =
PB,A(ba)PC,B(c, b)
PB(b)
where PB(b) is the marginal probability of variable B to take value b while PA,B(a, b) is the
marginal probability of the pair of variables A and B to take values a and b, and so on. We
assume for simplicity that P (b) is different from zero for all values b of B. Both Bayesian belief
networks encode the same joint probability; we cannot distinguish by covariation whether A
causes B or B causes A. In the language of factor graphs this joint probability can alternatively
be described by a factor graph [14] lA f lB g lC
h
(2)
with factors
f(a, b) = P (A = a,B = b) g(c, b) = P (C = c,B = b) h(b) = (P (B = b))−1 (3)
and
PA,B,C(a, b, c) =
1
Z
f(a, b)g(c, b)h(b) (4)
The partition function Z is determined by the interactions encoded by the factors of the factor
graph, and is in general difficult to compute for large models, but in the simple example
considered here it is obviously equal to one.
In both cases described above the joint probability of A and C conditioned on B is then
PA,C|B(a, c|see(B = b)) =
PA,B(a, b)PC,B(c, b)
(PB(b))2
= PA|B(a|b)PC|B(c|b) (5)
where we have introduced Pearl’s “see” notation [23]. To avoid confusion, let us note again that
PA|B(a|b) in above has its ordinary probabilistic meaning of
∑
c PA,B,C(a,b,c)∑
a,c PA,B,C(a,b,c)
and is the same in
both models.
If we intervene on B and set its value to b the two Belief networks lead to new joint
probabilities on the two remaining variables (A and C). In both cases A and C become
independent with probabilities depending parametrically on the set value b, which we can call
P
(B)
A (a; b) (“the probability distribution of random variable A in the modified model where
variable B has been set to constant b”) and P
(B)
C (c; b) (“the probability distribution of random
variable C in the modified model where variable B has been set to constant b”). Introducing
Pearl’s “do” notation [23] we then have
PA,C(a, c|do(B = b)) = P (B)A (a; b)P (B)C (c; b) (6)
and the dependencies can be illustrated as a (trivial) Bayesian networklA lC (7)
or as an (equally trivial) factor graph lA
e
lC
d
(8)
The two probability distributions are however not the same in the two cases.
In case (a) we have as numerical values P
(B)
A (a; b) = PA|B(a|b) and P (B)C (c; b) = PC|B(c|b),
because A and C are then both assumed to be caused by B; the factors in the factor graph
(8) are e = PA|B(a|b) and d = PC|B(c|b). For this case (5) and (6) hence describe the same
distribution.
In case (b) we also have P
(B)
C (c; b) = PC|B(c|b), but for the other probability instead
P
(B)
A (a; b) = PA(a) corresponding to a factor e = PA(a) in (8). This difference is ultimately
what it means to interpret the arrows in (1) as causes: if A is a cause and B is an effect
then A should be unaffected by B, and in particular unaffected by any outside intervention
on B. Therefore, whether or not there is any intervention on B, in case (b) the marginal
probability of A is and remains PA(a) and the “do” (6) is different from the “see” (5).
Expanding on the same point, in case (b) the “do-probability” PA,C(a, c|do(B = b)) can be
expressed in terms of probabilities observable before the intervention, namely as PA(a)PC|B(c|b),
but is not the same as the “see-probability” PA,C(a, c|see(B = b)) which is, for both cases,
PA|B(a|b)PC|B(c|b). The Kullback-Leibler distance between the two is (for this simple example)
KL(see(B = b)|do(B = b)) = ∑a PA|B(a|b) log PA|B(a|b)PA(a) , which generally is not zero.
We will now raise the abstraction level and following [23] define a general causal model M ,
also known as Structural Equation Model, as a set of exogenous variables U , a set of endogenous
variables V1, . . . , VN , located in nodes 1, . . . , N in a graph G, for each node i a set of parent
nodes PAi ⊂ {{1, . . . , N}\ i} and conditional probabilities Fi(Vi|VPAi , U). The structure of G is
determined by there being a link i→ j iff i ∈ PAj . Additionally one may include in the model
specifications a distribution P (U) over the exogenous variables [23]. Each such model defines a
joint probability distribution of the endogenous variables as
PM (V1, . . . , VN |U) = 1
ZM (U)
∏
i
Fi(Vi|VPAi , U) (9)
If G is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), so that dependencies cannot propagate in a loop,
clearly ZM (U) = 1. The do operator is introduced by Pearl as:
Interventions and counterfactuals are defined through a mathematical operator called
do(x), which simulates physical interventions by deleting certain functions from the
model, replacing them with a constant X = x, while keeping the rest of the model
unchanged. The resulting model is denoted Mx. The postintervention distribution
resulting from the action do(X = x) is given by the equation
PM (y|do(x)) = PMx(y)
Judea Pearl, “The Do-Calculus Revisited” (2012) [23]
It is useful to compare and contrast the do operation with the cavity method to be discussed in
more detail below in Section 4. Both modify a probabilistic model by eliminating one or more
variables, figuratively opening a hole (or cavity) in the factor graph. A first difference is that
in the cavity method the variable and all its interactions are eliminated as if they were never
there, while in a do operation the variable is set to a constant and the value of that constant
matters. Instead of (9) we thus have, taking X = Vk for some k,
PMvk =
1
ZMvk (U)
∏
i 6=k
k 6∈VPAi
Fi(Vi|VPAi , U)
∏
i6=k
k∈VPAi
F Vk=vki (Vi|{VPAi} \ Vk, U) (10)
where ZMvk is a new normalization constant and F
Vk=vk
i is a new function obtained from Fi by
setting the variable Vk to the constant vk. Hence we can express the “see” and the “do” as
P (Vi|see(Vk = vk)) = PM (Vi, Vk)
PM (Vk)
P (Vi|do(Vk = vk)) = PMvk (Vi) (11)
which again shows how and why the two concepts differ. A graphical illustration of the do
operation given in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the do operation. Left panel: a Bayesian belief network with a central node containing
variable X. Right panel: reduced Bayesian belief network after intervening on variable X setting it to value x.
Node containing X and outgoing links are indicated by dashed lines symbolizing that (10) depends parametrically
on x. Ingoing links to node containing X are eliminated together with random variable X which does not appear
in (10).
A second and more important difference is that the do operation is formulated for Bayesian
belief networks of which (as we have seen) there can be many corresponding to the same joint
probability distribution. Under the operations do(X) for different X, each Bayesian belief
network (i.e. each direction of the arrows in Eq. (1)) hence specifies a different set of changes
of the joint probability distribution encoded in a factor graph.
An important question in causal analysis is whether probabilities after an intervention, i.e.
PM (y|do(x)), y standing for any subset of the endogenous variables, can be determined from
observations before the intervention, i.e. from the set PM (z) (any and all z). When this is
so one says that a causal effect query is identifiable because it can be decided (the probability
PM (y|do(x)) estimated) from data obtained before an intervention. In both the simple examples
above this was the case, only the PM (y|do(x))’s were not the same. More generally, a causal
effect query is always identifiable from passively observed PM (z), provided that all variables in
M are observed and G is known [22]. In less technical terms this last statement means nothing
else than given sufficient data one can in principle estimate conditional probabilities, and given
a direction of the arrows in a Bayesian belief network one can translate this information into
what the conditional probabilities will be in a modified model; the situation is more complicated
when some variables are unobserved (un-measured). The Do-Calculus of Pearl consists of three
rules (a calculus, shown to be complete) for deciding identifiability when G is known and is
a DAG, and some of the variables are unobserved. The Do-Calculus can hence be used to
determine (in perhaps quite complex settings) whether a separate experiment is necessary, or
if an hypothetical question can be answered with the data already at hand. Other uses of Do-
Calculus are mediation, how to separate direct and indirect causal relationships, transportability,
how to determine how much information can be carried over to a new condition, and meta-
analysis, how to pool data obtained under different conditions, for more details see [23].
3. Correlation-Response
At the basis of scientific mathematical philosophy is the idea that the regularities of the
world are best expressed by how it changes in time, famously stated by Newton to Leibniz as
6accdae13eff7i319n4o4qrr4s8t12ux [2]. Let us therefore substitute the Bayesian belief network
in Section 2 by a minimal model encoding the same dependencies as a probabilistic evolution
law:
P (V1(t), . . . , VN (t)) =
N∏
i=1
Fi(Vi(t)|VPAi(t− 1))P (V1(t− 1), . . . , VN (t− 1)) (12)
The notation is here the same as in (9) except that the variables are now indexed by time (t)
and a possible dependence on exogenous variables has been suppressed. Up to the technical
simplification of synchronous dynamics, (12) is a prototype for a physically realistic mutual
dependency. It could be realized in a biological regulatory system, say in a signal transduction
network, where the cause-effect relationship between PAi and Vi would have the underlying
mechanistic interpretation of PAi being the kinases, phosphatases and other enzymes catalyzing
the phosphorylation, de-phosphorylation and other modifications to unit i. The endogenous
variables U are then concentrations of molecules at constant concentrations, which could be
sugars and other carbon sources for bacteria, or hormones and other signalling molecules in
multi-cellular organisms. For long times the probability distribution in (12) would then reach
stationary state which we will denote
P ∗(V1, . . . , VN |U) = lim
t→∞P (V1(t), . . . , VN (t)|U) (13)
Since P ∗ in (12) is at least as realistic as P in (9) as a representation of how the endogenous
variables depend on the exogenous variables we could also use it to define an analogy of the do
operation. We thus have
P ∗M (y|do(x = X)) = P ∗Mx(y) = limτ→∞R(y, x, t+ τ, t) (14)
where the last equality says that this is simply the long-time limit of a response function.
Generally a response function related to a generic quantity Vi(t) is defined as Rij(t, t
′) =
〈∂Vi(t)/∂Hj(t′)〉 where Hj(t′) is a general parameter which can be varied within the system.
An example, in ferromagnetic systems, is represented by the susceptibility function χij(t, t
′) =
〈∂Mi(t)/∂Hj(t′)〉 which gives a measure of the change in the local magnetization Mi(t) on
site i at time t due to a change of an external field Hj(t
′) acting on a different site j at an
earlier time t′. In this respect, the do operation, otherwise stated as an intervention on the
system, is similar to the variation of an (or several) external parameter(s) in a physical system
which generates a response function. A main goal of causal analysis can be then reformulated
as predicting suitable defined response functions under the change of some external tuneable
parameters (intervention). A great deal is known about such response functions for systems at
or near thermodynamic equilibrium where they are related to correlation functions through the
Fluctuation-Dissipation-Theorem, which generically takes the form [15, 25]
1
T
[C(τ = 0)− C(τ)] =
∫ τ
0
R(τ ′)dτ ′ (15)
where τ = t − t′, time translational invariance is assumed, and T is temperature. We note
that the left hand side of above is measured in the unperturbed system and the right hand side
in the perturbed system. Causal effect queries are therefore always identifiable in systems at
or near thermodynamic equilibrium from observing no more than the correlation between the
variable which is set and the variable one wants to predict. The relation between correlation
and response has been also used to improve for inference on a network [24].
4. Dynamic cavity
In this section we describe how the techniques now generally called message-passing or Belief
Propagation can be generalized to analyse evolution laws like (12). Message-passing techniques
have been invented independently in different fields [27, 14]. In Physics they are also known as
the cavity method [18], and usually traced back to [3]. Their purpose is to compute marginal
probabilities over some (usually small) subset of variables in a probabilistic model described by
a factor graph which is done by storing partial computations in nodes representing the variables
and then forwarding such partial results to neighbours in the graph for further processing.
Message-passing converges and is exact if the underlying graph is a tree but also often converges
and is a very good approximation if the underlying graph has only long loops, a fact that has
many theoretical and practical applications in coding theory and elsewhere [18]. The fixed points
of the algorithms correspond to stationary points under variation of the Bethe approximation
to the free energy in the corresponding statistical mechanics problem [27, 18].
Our point of departure is now the observation that the dynamics (12) naturally leads to a
probability distribution on variable histories
P (X1, . . . , XN ) = P (V1(0), . . . , VN (0))
T∏
t=1
N∏
i=1
Fi(Vi(t)|VPAi(t− 1)) (16)
where Xi = {Vi(0), . . . , Vi(T )} for i = 1, . . . , N . Before continuing, let us note that if
the variables are Boolean and take values {−1, 1} (“spins”) then (12) specifies a dynamics
of a spin system under synchronous updates, and if further all the transition probabilities
are of the type Fi(Vi(t)|VPAi(t − 1)) ∝ exp
(
Vi(t)
(
hi +
∑
j JijVj(t− 1)
))
is known as the
Kinetic Ising model [12]. The parent set VPAi is then comprised of the variables Vj for
which Jij is non-zero. When Jij = Jji for all pairs (i, j) the system has a stationary state
P (V1, . . . , VN ) ∝ exp
(∑
i hiVi +
∑
ij JijViVj
)
and (12) then simulates a system in thermal
equilibrium, albeit under the somewhat unphysical synchronous update rule. In the more general
case when Jij 6= Jji, and in particular for fully asymmetric models where Jij can only be non-zero
when Jji equals to zero, (12) on the other hand simulates a non-equilibrium system.
The first result on reducing the complexity of (16) dates back almost thirty years [8] and
pertains to fully asymmetric models. For these an influence Xj → Xi must traverse a loop in
G to get back to Xj , and when there are no loops, or when these can otherwise be disregarded,
the marginal probability of Xj is independent of Xi. This leads to simple equation for the
marginalization over a single variable and and single time, namely
Pi(Vi, t) =
∑
Vj∈PAi
Fi(Vi|VPAi)
∏
j
Pj(Vj , t− 1) (Fully asymmetric) (17)
We now generalize a bit and assume that the dependency graph G has the property associated
with the effectiveness of standard message-passing i.e. that it is a tree, or at least locally tree-
like. That is, we assume that one cannot form circular dependency chains i→ j → k → · · · → i
where Vi ∈ PAj , Vj ∈ PAk, . . . ∈ PAi unless either somewhere the chain backtracks as
· · · j → k → j → · · · or the chain is long, on the order of the graph diameter of G. The
term “dynamic cavity” was introduced in [13] for such situations where it was used to obtain
rigorous bounds on the consensus threshold for the majority dynamics. Methods have later been
developed to treat, in principle exactly, such problems when the dynamical law is modified to only
allow transitions in one direction [17, 6]. An important step was taken in [19] where marginals
in a stationary state were computed approximately based on an ansatz, recently extended to
to a perturbative scheme and to also cover transient phenomena [10, 4]. The main problem is
then that even when the dependency graph G of the dynamics in (12) is locally tree-like this
is not the case for dependencies in (16) due to “loops-in-time”. These dependencies have been
resolved by a graph expansion technique [17, 6, 10] which we now explain.
First, as for the Kinetic Ising model it is often convenient to define transition functions only
up to a normalization Fi(Vi|VPAi) ∝ exp (ri(Vi, VPAi)). The normalization constant is then
Ni(VPAi) =
∑
Vi
exp (ri(Vi, VPAi)), a function that does not depend explicitly on Vi. Assuming
further for simplicity that interaction functions ri are only pair-wise the dependency graph can
be illustrated as in Fig. 2. The model defined on variable histories, (16), now has short-loop
dependencies even if the graph G itself does not. This can be seen by tracing the dependency of
one of these variable, say Xi = {Vi(0), . . . , Vi(T )}. Pick a time t and notice that Vi(t) depends
on Vj(t− 1) for all j ∈ PAi. Then pick two of these variables Xj and Xk such that i ∈ PAj and
i ∈ PAj , then Vj(t− 1) and Vk(t− 1) both depend on Vi(t− 2). At the same time Vj(t− 1) and
Vk(t− 1) are however also dependent through the normalization Ni(VPAi), and Xi, Xj and Xk
are therefore connected in a dependency loop of length three.
Figure 2. A tree-like dependency graph with the normalization constants in the transition functions split off as
separate factor nodes (boxes). It has been assumed that the dependencies are not fully asymmetric so that when
node i depends on node j, node j in general also depends on node i. Dependencies between nodes (in general
mutual) are indicated by (undirected) lines. In the kinetic model loops emerge from variables at different times
in (16).
While there are many approaches to get rid of loops in factor graphs we will use one which is
well adapted to the dynamics. For every pair i and j such that Vi ∈ PAj (whether or not also
Vj ∈ PAi) we introduce a new compound variable (X(ij)i , X(ij)j ) interpreted as “variable X(ij)i of
type Xi belonging to link (i, j) and X
(ij)
j of type Xj also belonging to link (i, j)”
2. Introducing
2 To be precise the two parts of the compound variable are distinguished by their index (i or j) and not by
now the consistency requirement that the variables X
(ij)
i take the same value for all the links
(i, j) where this type of variable is found we can rewrite (16) as
P ({X(ij)i , X(ij)j }) = Pinit
T∏
t=1
∏
i
Fi(Vi(t)|{V (ij)j (t− 1)}j∈PAi)
=
T∏
t=1
∏
i
1
V
(ij1)
i (t)=V
(ij2)
i (t)=...
(18)
where Pinit is the probability distribution on the initial conditions translated to the new
variables, V
(ij)
j (t) are the restrictions of the variables X
(ij)
j to a single time t and Vi(t) is any
suitable average of the V
(ij)
i (t) for different j [10]. The graph expansion is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Introducing messages in the standard way and summing out the consistency conditions we thus
i
j3
j2
j1
k1
k2
(X
(ij1)
j1
, X
(ij1)
i )
(X
(ij3)
i , X
(ij3)
j3
)
(X
(ij2)
i , X
(ij2)
j2
)(X
(k1,j1)
k1
, X
(k1,j1)
j1
)
(X
(k2,j1)
k2
, X
(k2,j1)
j1
)
k1, j1
k2, j1
j1, i
i, j2
i, j3
Figure 3. Auxiliary graph obtained from a part of Fig. 2 where loops have been removed by a graph expansion
procedure. The new variable nodes contain histories of two variables that were neighbours in the original graph
while new factor nodes (one per each old variable node) contain both the transition functions and the consistency
conditions.
arrive at [10]
mi→(ij)(X
(ij)
i , X
(ij)
j ) ∝
∑
{X(ik)k }
Φi(X
(ij)
i , X
(ij)
j , {X(ik)k })
∏
k∈∂i\j
mk→(ik)(X
(ik)
k , X
(ij)
i ) (19)
where Φi(Xi, Xj , {Xk}) =
∏T
t=1 Fi(Vi(t)|Vj(t − 1), {Vk(t − 1)}k∈PAi\j). Equation (19) are the
dynamic cavity update equations which are the same as ordinary cavity update equations
applied to the model (16) on variable histories. A trace of the dynamic origin remains
in that the probability mi→(ij)(X
(ij)
i , X
(ij)
j ) can be taken to depend on the full history
X
(ij)
i = {V (ij)i (0), . . . , V (ij)i (T )} of the first argument, but only a one unit shorter history
X
(ij)′
j = {V (ij)j (0), . . . , V (ij)j (T − 1)} of the second argument. For a discussion as well as a
description of the analogous dynamic cavity output equations, see [10]. To make (19) practical
further assumptions are needed, to close the iterations in a low-dimensional subspace of the
functions mi→(ij)(X
(ij)
i , X
(ij)
j ). In [10] good results were reported based on closure in the class
of 1-step Markov processes, leading to schemes not much more complicated than (17) while
in [4] even better results were reported from more involved procedure. The field is in active
development and likely even better approximations will appear in the near future.
We will now take the point of view that the probabilities P ∗ and P ∗Mx in (13) and (14)
are efficiently computatable and ask what are the implications for causal analysis. First, the
their order in the pair. When a message is to be transmitted from i to j they are naturally read in the order
(X
(ij)
i , X
(ij)
j ) while if the message is transmitted in the opposite direction the natural order is (X
(ij)
j , X
(ij)
i ).
assumption of synchronous updates is unrealistic in most natural systems but certainly no more
so than the assumption of instantaneous dependence made in (9). In most problems where an
underlying mechanistic explanation is conceivable “causes” are ultimately to be interpreted as
variables influencing transition rates, and the simplest example of such dynamics is (12). In
stationary state an underlying explanation, which one could call “mechanistic causes”, leads
to a joint probability distribution P ∗ with generally many more dependencies. That is, there
will be one (directed) dependency graph G describing the probabilistic evolution law (12) and
another (undirected) factor graph F describing the probability P ∗ in (13), and F will almost
always be (much) larger and (much) richer than G. For a worked-out example of such an effect,
in the relaxation towards equilibrium of the Kinetic Ising model on a 1D lattice [12], see [9].
The stark conclusion of these in essence elementary considerations is hence simply that
causal analysis should be treated with a great deal of caution. The causes identified by causal
analysis may not be causes at all in the everyday understanding of the word. Instead they
may incorporate all kinds of indirect effects from forcing a stationary state of a dynamics to be
represented by a Bayesian belief network, potentially masking a far simpler underlying reality.
5. Summary and discussion
We have given a brief introduction to causal analysis and discussed how it extends the tools
of factor graphs and probabilistic models to describe outside interventions that change the
models themselves. We have compared and contrasted causal analysis to the analysis of dynamic
processes by the dynamic cavity method and pointed out similarities between causal analysis
and physical correlation-response theory.
The do calculus consideres causal relationships to be the fundamental building blocks of
reality [22] and aims to discover which are these casual dependences in the system under
investigation (usually DAG networks). Although this certainly is a fascinating goal, it is at odds
with physical theory which does not admit causes and effects in the philosophical sense on the
fundamental level, but only for macroscopic (irreversible) processes. For such processes the flow
of time is however essential, and causes are thus naturally understood as variables influencing
transition rates between various states in a system. The stationary states of such processes are
normally quite complicated reflecting not only the the dependencies in the transition rates, but
also chains of such dependencies of arbitrary length, the only major exception being systems
in thermodynamic equilibrium. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results of
causal analysis as causes in an everyday – e.g legal – sense. The mechanisms identified by causal
analysis include (except in thermal equilibrium) both underlying direct effects and many kinds
of indirect effects where the setting of one variable influences the behaviour of another at a later
time through one or many intermediaries.
The major advantage of causal analysis is instead in its relative simplicity of its basic ansatz.
Up to recent times few methods except Monte Carlo simulations were available to analyse the
dynamics of non-equilibrium systems, and determining their stationary states was therefore
laborious. We have discussed that for some systems the dynamic cavity offers an alternative
approach which could therefore be used as an alternative starting point of causal analysis. Many
major issues however remain to be solved in that approach, the most important one perhaps
being how to extend the dynamic cavity (if possible) to continuous-time processes.
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